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Abstract
We provide experimental evidence of behavior consistent with the sunk cost effect.
Subjects who earned a lottery via a real-effort task were given an opportunity to
switch to a dominant lottery; yet 23% chose to stick with their dominated lottery.
The endowment effect accounts for roughly only one third of the effect. Subjects’
capacity for cognitive reflection is a significant determinant of sunk cost behavior.
We also find stocks of knowledge or experience (crystallized intelligence) predict
sunk cost behavior, rather than algorithmic thinking (fluid intelligence) or the per-
sonality trait of openness. We construct and validate a scale, the “SCE-8”, which
encompasses many resources individuals can spend, and offers researchers an ef-
ficient way to measure susceptibility to the sunk cost effect. JEL: D91, C83, C90
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“No matter how far you’ve gone down the wrong road, turn back.”
- Turkish proverb
1 Introduction
In a famous example by Thaler (1999), an individual who purchased a $20 ticket to a concert
finds themselves driving for hours through a blizzard, just because they feel it would be wasteful
to ignore the initial investment. A seminal definition of this “sunk cost fallacy” or “sunk cost
effect” by Arkes and Blumer (1985) characterizes individuals as falling prey to the effect when
they continue an endeavor as a result of previously invested resources such as time, money, or
effort. Many definitions have been offered, but core to them all is the idea that some actions
(sunk) in the past constrain decision-making in the present despite the fact that the actions do
not affect the attractiveness of the available options. The effect seems ubiquitous, with work
showing that it is even present in mice and rats (Sweis et al., 2018). It is also an important part
of the work by Thaler (1999) on mental accounting, which is based on the idea that individuals
often fail to treat money as a fully fungible resource. We offer contributions to the identification,
understanding, and measurement of the sunk cost effect in humans.
First, we conduct an experiment with pecuniary incentives to detect behavior consistent with
the sunk cost effect in a controlled setting. Subjects in the primary treatment group completed
a real-effort task to earn a lottery. The subjects who earned the lottery (n = 268) were then
given the (unanticipated) choice to switch to a dominant lottery; but 23% chose to stick with
their earned (and dominated) lottery. To uncover how much of the sunk cost effect is due to the
endowment effect we ran a second treatment group in which subjects (n = 197) did not face
the effort task, but were instead endowed with the inferior lottery before having the choice to
switch to the superior lottery; 7% chose to stick with their endowed (and dominated) lottery.
Second, we document correlations between sunk cost behavior and different traits that have
been argued to be related to the effect. One type of cognitive ability introduced by Frederick
(2005), “cognitive reflection”, concerns the ability of an individual to override a heuristically-
primed response (“system 1”; Kahneman, 2011) and engage in further reflection (“system 2”)
to figure out the correct answer, and has been found to be predictive of various types of biases
(Toplak et al., 2011). We test its capacity to explain our behavioral measure of the sunk cost
effect and find it to be a highly significant predictor. Since cognitive reflection is itself likely to
be a function of different aspects of intelligence and thinking style (Stanovich and West, 2008)
we also test three of these measures and find crystallized intelligence to be a significant driver.
Third, we validate a scale comprised of hypothetical scenarios to measure individuals’ suscep-
tibility to the sunk cost effect. Using factor analysis, we refine the scale down from 18 to 8
scenarios; the SCE-8. We find that our SCE-8 measure emulates the behavioral measure gen-
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erated by our experiment well. This suggests the SCE-8 may adequately measure subjects’
susceptibility to the sunk cost effect in lieu of a behavioral measure. As such, we offer our scale
as a simpler and more cost-effective way to capture subjects’ susceptibility to the effect.
Fourth, to reflect the wide-ranging nature of the effect we include multiple types of sunk re-
sources including effort, time, money and emotional attachment. Effort and time are perhaps
the most relevant costs in our experiment, but all four are represented in the SCE-8. Our results
indicate that many different sunk resources contribute to a singular, underlying sunk cost effect.
We also provide a definition of the sunk cost effect and contrast it with the endowment effect.
Given the tight structure of our definition it is also possible to distinguish between the sunk cost
effect and the sunk cost fallacy which are often used interchangeably.
We next review the relevant literature and our relative contribution, before detailing the design
and results. We end with a discussion and some concluding remarks.
2 Literature
Many papers report evidence of behavior consistent with the sunk cost effect. These studies
typically rely on responses to hypothetical questions, are subject to various confounds, or are
field experiments that tend to suffer from real-world factors that complicate the interpretation
of the effect. For example, it can be hard to disentangle the sunk cost effect from other pos-
sible reasons for behavior in real world situations involving price data (Ashraf et al., 2010;
Berry et al., 2020; Cohen et al., 2015), while consumer goods may be subject to heterogeneous
mental accounting (Arkes and Blumer, 1985; Just and Wansink, 2011), and penny auctions can
suffer from intractable bidding environments (Augenblick, 2016). In contrast, lab and online
experiments offer greater control and cleaner measurement; attractive merits for our purposes.
Some experiments have attempted to identify the sunk cost effect. Friedman et al. (2007) find
limited evidence of the effect, but with a design that does not give subjects a choice between
actions, an important factor in generating the effect (Staw, 1976). The design of Weigel (2018)
features choice but employs a penny auction task, the dynamic nature of which raises the need
to control for confounds such as the gambler’s fallacy.1 In contrast, we conduct an experiment
with a simple structure in which subjects sink resources then make a one-off decision.
Several papers have tested the role of cognition in accounting for sunk cost behavior.2 Evidence
has been mixed, with often a small or insignificant correlation found between intelligence mea-
sures and sunk costs. However, the majority of studies measure sunk cost behavior using un-
1The lab experiment of Haita-Falah (2017) is a second design allowing for choice, but the task and instructions are
complex and there is evidence subjects may not understand the task (see e.g., Weigel, 2018, footnote 3).
2A more general drive in economics has examined the relationship of cognitive ability to other important charac-
teristics e.g., temporal and risk preferences (Dohmen et al., 2010) and cooperation (Proto et al., 2019).
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validated hypothetical scenarios e.g., Bruine de Bruin et al. (2007); Larrick et al. (1993); Parker
and Fischhoff (2005); Stanovich and West (2008); Strough et al. (2008); Toplak et al. (2011).
We incentivize subjects to sink resources via a real-effort task and find evidence that cognitive
reflection and crystallized intelligence measures significantly explain the variation in our data.
Early in the study of the sunk cost effect, there were discussions of the extent to which non-
monetary resources might be fungible. For instance, Thaler (1999) briefly discusses how people
appear to allocate time sub-optimally, while Soman (2001) argues people treat sunk time and
sunk money differently. However, there have been almost no attempts within the literature to
explore the commensurability of time, effort, money or emotional attachment as separate factors
in a sunk cost problem. This might be considered important especially if these concepts cannot
be converted readily into monetary values (Leclerc et al., 1995). We include different resources
in our scale (time, money, effort, and emotion) and find them all to be relevant in describing a
single underlying factor: susceptibility to the sunk cost effect.
When considering the role of cognition in explaining behavioral biases, it is important to distin-
guish between different measures. Cognitive reflection is a type of cognitive ability introduced
by Frederick (2005) relating to the ability to override a heuristically-primed or knee-jerk re-
sponse and engage in further reflection to figure out a correct answer, and has been found to
predict various types of bias (Toplak et al., 2011). We test its potential to explain the sunk
cost effect using our behavioral and scale measures, and find it highly predictive of both. An
individual’s cognitive reflection, in turn, is likely dependent on other aspects of intelligence
and thinking style (Stanovich and West, 2008; Stanovich, 2012). In particular, accumulated
stocks of knowledge and experience that might help them to recognize the need to override an
instinctive response (crystallized intelligence) and styles of thinking conducive to discovering
new perspectives on a problem (open-minded thinking). Interestingly, the literature identifies
fluid intelligence (the ability to think logically or algorithmically, as measured by various I.Q.
tests) as having less of a role, because the computational power required to override an impul-
sive response is often only very slight (Stanovich, 2008): what matters is recognizing the need
to override it in the first place. Our results support this hypothesis in the context of sunk costs.
Our paper is the first to validate a scale composed of hypothetical scenarios to measure the sunk
cost effect. The effect is not currently measured by any widely accepted scale. It evades, e.g.,
the “Big 5” personality inventory (Costa and McCrae, 1989). As one of the most widely known
behavioral biases, having a reliable yet easy to use measure seems important. To this end, we
offer our SCE-8 scale to researchers for any study in which the sunk cost effect may explain
outcomes, reducing or eliminating the need to run a full experiment. Collecting SCE-8 data
would allow subjects’ susceptibility to the sunk cost effect to be measured and used in the same
way as other common items including risk tolerance (Blais and Weber, 2006), patience levels
(Brockhoff et al., 2015), and personality measures (Costa and McCrae, 1989).
4
3 Design
Our design combines a randomized experiment, a scale composed of hypothetical questions,
and trait measures that have been linked to susceptibility to the sunk cost effect. We organize
and structure our approach around a definition of the sunk cost effect, which we detail now.
3.1 The sunk cost and endowment effects
If an individual has sunk resources positively associated with an alternative, and chooses that
alternative, but would not have chosen it if no such resources were sunk, we define that individ-
ual as exhibiting the sunk cost effect. More formally, consider a binary choice set {X,Y} and a
quantity of resources r ≥ 0 sunk in ways positively associated with X, where r does not directly
affect the utility garnered from either X or Y , and let Ci({X,Y}; r) be i’s choice function. We say
i exhibits the sunk cost effect when r > 0, Ci({X,Y}; r) = X, and Ci({X,Y}; 0) = Y .3,4
Within our definition of the sunk cost effect, the term “positively associated” is general, reflect-
ing the diverse range of contexts across which the effect applies. A simpler example may be the
money spent on (and hence positively associated with) a theater ticket, while a more complex
example may be the various resources sunk into (and hence positively associated with) devel-
oping previous stages of an ongoing project. We are also agnostic about what might count as a
cost and our hypothetical scenarios cover several: effort, time, money, and emotion.
What distinguishes the sunk cost effect from the endowment effect (Kahneman et al., 1990)
is that the former requires some resources to be sunk. In contrast, the latter occurs when an
individual receives an endowment costlessly, deriving value from the very fact they have it.
The sunk cost effect is thereby more nuanced, specifying that the individual must have spent
(sunk) some resources to have the “endowment”. As such, we view the endowment effect as an
essential and necessary part of the sunk cost effect: when an individual exhibits the sunk cost
effect they also exhibit the endowment effect, but the reverse is not necessarily true.
To detect the part of the sunk cost effect net of the endowment effect (and hence the existence
of the sunk cost effect in its own right), we dedicate a treatment group to measuring the latter.
By comparing responses there to those in our primary sunk cost group, we can identify whether
sunk costs have an effect over and above the otherwise standard endowment effect.
3Moreover, if this is true and i believes X yields higher utility we say that i exhibits the sunk cost fallacy, which
is therefore a subset of the effect. Our definitions imply that within mainstream economics, the effect and fallacy
are identical as Ci(X,Y) = X typically implies that i believes Ui(X) > Ui(Y), where Ui is i′s utility function. This
may explain why the two terms are often used interchangeably. Our definitions otherwise serve to label the choice
outcome as the effect and the beliefs supporting that outcome as the fallacy. Others have also drawn distinctions
between the terms but without explicit mention of payoffs or beliefs, e.g., Olivola (2018) remarks that the fallacy
refers to taking an inferior action due to sunk costs whereas the effect refers only to taking a different action.
4A related and older term is the “Concorde effect” (Dawkins and Carlisle, 1976), named after the sustained invest-
ment in the Concorde supersonic jet project, after it was recognized to be an unprofitable venture.
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3.2 Experiment
Subjects. Subjects were recruited via the Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) online platform,
commonly used throughout the social sciences including economics (e.g., DellaVigna and Pope,
2017; Kuziemko et al., 2015). MTurk’s population has been shown to be more demographically
diverse and to produce data of a comparable quality to some more traditional participant pools
(Chandler et al., 2014; Paolacci and Chandler, 2014), with many studies replicating classic ex-
periments across various domains including cognitive psychology (e.g., Goodman et al., 2013;
Paolacci et al., 2010) and economics (e.g., Horton et al., 2011). The software Qualtrics was
used to perform the experiment. We restricted participation to those in the US, with a good
track record (at least 95% of MTurk jobs approved), at least some experience (successfully
completed at least 50 MTurk jobs), and who had not taken part in any of our pilots.
Pre-trial registration. The experiment was registered in advance in the AEA RCT Registry
(Ronayne et al., 2019). There, we provided an experimental design, power calculations, and
detailed our intention to study: reflective thinking as captured by the Cognitive Reflection Test;
fluid and crystallized intelligence captured by Raven’s progressive matrices and the verbal rea-
soning item of the International Cognitive Ability Resource, respectively; the Openness scale
from the Big Five Personality Inventory; and various demographics. All these measures are
included in our analysis, and no other measures were pre-registered.
Design overview. Our design involved one wave of data collection from 528 subjects.5 Subjects
were randomly allocated to one of three groups such that approximately 60% and 35% fell into
our primary and secondary treatment groups, with 5% in the final group.
In the primary sunk cost group, subjects completed a real-effort task (counting letters in blocks
of text composed of Latin words). If they did well, they earned a lottery (termed an “asset” for
subjects) paying $10 with a 10% chance (else $0), before being given an (unanticipated) choice
to switch to a dominant lottery paying $10 with a 20% chance (else $0). The $1 difference in
expected payoff corresponds to 25% of the subjects’ participation fee, and represents a mean-
ingful amount to the MTurk population, who regularly respond to similar stakes. We detail the
task below (and present a redacted transcript in the Appendix), but the essential idea is that the
effort, time, etc. exerted to obtain the lottery in the task form a sunk resource, r > 0, positively
associated with it, which, if susceptible to the sunk cost effect, leads an individual to a different
choice (the inferior lottery) to that if they had spent no such resources (the superior lottery).
In the endowment group, subjects did not complete the real-effort task to earn the asset. Instead,
these subjects were endowed with the inferior (10% chance of $10) lottery before facing the
same (unanticipated) choice to switch to the dominant (20% chance of $10) lottery.
5Calculations suggested this adequate to detect effects with 80% power and 5% significance (Ronayne et al., 2019).
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The third and final group was run to check that subjects could generally be expected to maximize
their expected pecuniary outcome and understood the wording and descriptions of the lotteries.
Subjects in this condition did not face any real-effort task and were not endowed with anything.
They were simply given a straight choice between the two lotteries.
After their group-specific tasks, all subjects completed a set of psychometric measures. First,
18 hypothetical scenarios (presented in a random order) to each of which they responded via a
6-point Likert scale. These scenarios form the basis of the scale we set out to validate; the num-
bered list is in the redacted transcript in the Appendix. Table 1 details which scenarios highlight
which sunk resources: effort, time, money, emotion, and a final category belief, shorthand for
the resources sunk during the process of belief formation, which is likely to be a subset of effort.
Table 1: Different types of sunk resources highlighted by the hypothetical scenarios
Resource Scenario ID
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
Effort 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Time 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Money 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Emotion 3 3 3
Belief 3 3 3
The full text of the 18 scenarios is given in the redacted transcript in the Appendix. A dark tick indicates the
scenario’s primary focus, while lighter ticks indicate some secondary resources.
Subjects then completed the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT), measures of fluid and crystallized
intelligence, and openness to experience. The CRT measures reflective capacity, i.e., the ability
to think about problems that tend to induce people to fall prey to a behavioral bias (Frederick,
2005). We adopt the extended version of the test (Toplak et al., 2014), which consists of 7
right/wrong questions, giving each subject a score in {0, . . . , 7}.
Fluid intelligence was measured using 10 Raven’s progressive matrices (John and Raven, 2003),
giving scores {0, . . . , 10}. We follow the common practice of assessing crystallized intelligence
by verbal reasoning ability (e.g., Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007) and use the 16-item verbal reason-
ing subset of the International Cognitive Ability Resource (ICAR) (Condon and Revelle, 2014),
giving scores {0, . . . , 16}. Potential for open-minded thinking was gauged via the openness to
experience personality trait, which we measured using a 12-item sub-scale from the NEO Five
Factor Inventory (Costa and McCrae, 1989); each item is responded to via a 5-point Likert scale
coded {0, . . . , 4}, giving scores {0, . . . , 48}.
The measures were incentivized such one of each subject’s answers (across the CRT, ICAR,
and Raven’s tests) was chosen at random, and if correct, $2 was added to their payment. Last,
demographic information was collected. We now outline the sunk cost task in greater detail.
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The sunk cost task. Subjects in our primary (sunk cost) group were able to earn a lottery
(termed an “asset” in the experimental instructions) by sinking sufficient resources into a task
of counting letters (similar to that used by Rosaz and Villeval, 2012). Each subject faced a
sequence of five blocks of text. For each block they were asked to count the number of occur-
rences of two different letters under a time limit of 60 seconds (see Figure 1 for a screenshot).
For each letter correctly counted (within a margin of error of one), they got one point. If they
got a total of 6 out of 10 points or more, they earned the inferior lottery paying $10 with a 10%
chance, $0 otherwise. To avoid potential emotional primes from valences of familiar words,
randomly-selected Latin words (from the Lorem Ipsum corpus) were used.
Figure 1: Real-effort task
Subjects in the sunk cost group entered letter counts for five blocks of text. A timer showed the amount
of time remaining (here, 55 seconds). If subjects did not enter a count, their answer was logged as
incorrect. If time expired, the answers present were submitted, and the subject automatically progressed
to the next page. All these points were covered in the instructions. The words were uploaded as an
image file to prevent “CTRL+F” commands from giving the answer. Only integers were accepted.
Pilots revealed substantial heterogeneity in subjects’ ability in the task. With a fixed set of text
for all subjects, we expected to lose a lot of data because many would fail to reach a particular
score out of 10 (and thus not earn a lottery). To increase efficiency, we implemented subject-
specific block paths (unknown to subjects). Specifically, based on their performance on the first
text block, subjects were branched into five routes (very hard, hard, medium, or easy; some were
branched into a very easy route if they also performed poorly in their second block). Tailoring
the task to individual ability levels also has the potential advantage of reducing the variation in
the amount of resources subjects sunk into the task. In our experiment, 268 of 305 (88%) scored
at least 6/10, made it through to the asset choice, and so can be included in all our analyses.
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4 Results
We collected data from 528 subjects over July 22-24, 2019. Average completion time was
27m20s. Subjects received $4.00 for participating, an average hourly wage of $8.78 ($11.21
including incentive payments). Subject demographics are given in Table A1 in the Appendix.
4.1 The sunk cost effect
Table 2 reports the proportion of subjects in the three different treatment groups who chose the
dominated lottery. We first report that 23% (95CI= [18, 28]%) of the 268 subjects in the sunk
cost group who earned the dominated lottery from the real-effort task chose to stick with it,
which we interpret as evidence of behavior consistent with the sunk cost effect.6
In the endowment group, 7% (95CI= [4, 11]%) of the 197 subjects chose the dominated asset.
The difference in the proportion of irrational decisions between the sunk cost and endowment
groups is significantly different from zero (d = 0.16; p < 0.001): the sunk cost effect was
present and not entirely explained by the endowment effect. In fact, in our data the sunk cost
motive appeared to exert a significantly greater influence on decisions than the endowment
motive per se, with the latter accounting for approximately only a third of the overall effect.
Last, we point out that none of the 25 subjects presented with a straight choice chose the domi-
nated alternative. This suggests it is unlikely an individual would choose that asset due to basic
mathematical deficiency, misunderstanding the text, or some experimental demand effect.
Table 2: Behavior consistent with the sunk cost effect
Condition Choice Pr(dominated)
dominated dominant n
Earned via sunk costs 62 206 268 0.231
Endowment only 14 183 197 0.071
Straight choice 60 225 225 0.000
Difference in proportions 0.160
P-value <0.001
4.2 Drivers of sunk cost behavior
Table 3 first reports that the average marginal effect (AME) of cognitive reflection levels on the
probability of sunk cost behavior is significant (both p < 0.001) and negative: a one standard
deviation increase corresponds to a decrease in the probability of approximately 0.11-0.12.
6A different explanation is that performance, rather than sunk cost, matters. If so, subjects scoring higher would
be more likely to stick with the dominated lottery, but we find a negative correlation (r = −0.16; p = 0.009).
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Table 3: Determinants of susceptibility to the sunk cost effect
Average marginal effects Dependent variable: Behavior
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Cognitive reflection
-0.112∗∗∗
(0.023)
-0.116∗∗∗
(0.023)
Fluid intelligence
-0.013
(0.030)
-0.009
(0.028)
Crystallized intelligence
-0.173∗∗∗
(0.028)
-0.175∗∗∗
(0.030)
Openness
-0.000
(0.022)
-0.000
(0.022)
Demographics X X
Observations 265 265 265 265
∗∗∗p < 0.001; ∗∗p < 0.01; ∗p < 0.05. Average marginal effects with robust standard errors in parentheses.
Estimates from the underlying probit regressions are in Table A2 in the Appendix. Regressors are standard-
ized. Behavior is a binary variable = 1 if the subject displayed behavior consistent with the sunk cost effect.
Demographics include sex, age, race, household income, education, and conservatism. Of the 268 subjects in
the sunk cost treatment group, 3 chose not to specify their sex, leaving 265 for analysis.
Guided by the tripartite theory of the mind of Stanovich (2012), we now assess the strength of
inputs of the reflective mind in explaining sunk cost behavior.7 We find crystallized intelligence
to be significant (both p < 0.001), but not fluid intelligence or openness to experience, as
reported in specifications (3) and (4) of Table 3.8 Interpreting the estimated AMEs, a one
standard deviation increase in crystallized intelligence decreases the probability of sunk-cost
behavior by approximately 17-18 percentage points on average.
Interpretation. Previous work (Stanovich, 2012; Stanovich and West, 2008, discussed in Sec-
tion 2) suggests the key to being able to override a heuristically-primed response is recognizing
the need to override it in the first place (while the capacity required to avoid the bias once
recognized is relatively slight). As such, stocks of knowledge or experience (crystallized in-
telligence) and openness of mind are likely to matter more than computational power (fluid
intelligence). Our results concerning intelligence measures support this hypothesis in the con-
text of sunk costs. A natural interpretation is that a bigger stock of experience is helpful in
enabling individuals to recognize instances of the sunk cost effect and thereby avoid them.
Stanovich and West (2008) also argue conventional measures lack the scope to adequately cap-
ture the types of knowledge required for situations that invoke behavioral biases, but our evi-
dence suggests they do not. Contrary to their hypothesis we do not find a relationship between
7Auxiliary regressions show both intelligence measures are associated with CRT scores (see Table A3).
8The two intelligence measures are of course correlated (r = 0.60; p < 0.001) and either measure alone explains
significant variation in sunk cost behavior. However, when both are included in regressions, only crystallized
intelligence retains explanatory power. See Table A4 for the supporting regressions.
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sunk cost behavior and openness to experience. This could be because that personality trait is
not a major driver of this mode of thinking, because it is not a major driver of the sunk cost
effect, or something particular to our sample; a question for future research.
4.3 SCE-8: A scale to measure susceptibility to the sunk cost effect
We first analyze the latent factor structure of our 528 subjects’ responses to the 18 scenarios to
identify any underlying factors causing them to covary. Informed by that analysis we select the
scenarios to be included in our scale, which we then relate back to behavior.
Exploratory factor analysis. Various checks support the factorability of the data: multi-
collinearity between the 18 items is low (mean variance inflation factor: 1.22); Bartlett’s spheric-
ity test is significant (χ2(153) = 1160.29; p < 0.001); and the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of
sampling adequacy (0.83) surpasses the advised threshold of 0.6 (Kaiser and Rice, 1974). Ex-
tracting factors with eigenvalues > 1 (the Kaiser criterion; Kaiser, 1960), we find one principal
factor that explains 90% of the variance (with an eigenvalue of 2.81). A scree test (Cattell,
1966) also supports a one-factor solution, dropping-off substantially after the first factor. Inves-
tigating the fit of that solution, we extract one factor (and rotate it using direct oblimin rotation
to enhance interpretability) and find that the majority (11 of 18) of scale items load well onto it
(with a loading > 0.32; Costello and Osborne, 2005), as reported in the first row of Table 4.
Table 4: Factor loadings by scenario ID
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
25 18 50 28 24 46 35 39 39 57 49 59 20 43 53 44 30 3
- - 48 - - 48 - - - 56 48 62 - 44 55 50 - -
Loadings are multiplied by 100. The first and second rows report the loadings from the factor analysis
with all 18 and the selected 8 (SCE-8 scale) scenarios, respectively.
We follow recommended practice and drop items with weak loadings (< 0.32). We also drop
items that fail to meet this threshold when excluding subjects (n = 40) who completed the 18
scenarios in less than 90 seconds (items 7 and 8). Finally, we drop item 9 because its loading of
0.34 (after dropping 7 and 8) is marginal and because time (the predominant resource it relates
to) is well represented by several other items with strong loadings. The loadings generated from
the remaining 8 scenarios are given in the second row of Table 4. A reliability analysis of those
items demonstrates internal consistency (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.75).9
Confirmatory factor analysis. To confirm the suitability of a one-factor representation of
these 8 items, we estimate a structural equation model that links subjects’ responses to them
with one latent variable. We find the standardized factor loadings of each of the 8 items to be
9A scale with all 11 items with initial loadings > 0.32 yields a negligibly higher Cronbach’s alpha of 0.749 (cf.
0.747 with 8 items), owing to the fact that the additional three items have notably weaker loadings.
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significant (p < 0.001) and above the recommended value (0.32). Goodness-of-fit measures
are also satisfactory: the standardized root mean squared error is 0.02, falling in the “good” to
“excellent” range (0.01-0.05; MacCallum et al., 1996), while the χ2-to-degrees-of-freedom ratio
is 1.02 (ratios between 1-3 are acceptable, with values closer to 1 indicating a better fit; Bollen
and Scott Long, 1993). We name the 8-scenario scale the “SCE-8”. The scale is provided in the
Appendix, along with the corresponding scores of our subjects (presented in Figure A1).
Interpretation. Across the scenarios, different types of costs are sunk to different degrees. We
interpret the emergence of a single factor as the best representation of the data as reflecting both
the idea that the sunk cost effect applies across resources, and the highly interdependent nature
of the resources involved. Moreover, amongst the scenarios with the highest loadings, there is
at least one scenario in which each of the main resources covered is the predominant resource
(see Tables 1 and 4), further suggesting that the factor is relevant for various kinds of sunk cost.
Validating a sunk cost scale with real decisions. Sunk cost behavior and our SCE-8 scale have
a significant pairwise correlation (r = 0.26; p < 0.001). Furthermore, as Table 5 shows, the
scale is significantly associated to cognitive reflection (both p < 0.001), just as our behavioral
measure is (as seen in Table 3). Interpreting the coefficients, a one standard deviation increase
in cognitive reflection is associated with an approximate decrease of 0.4 standard deviations in
susceptibility to the sunk cost effect as measured by the SCE-8. Moreover, unpacking cognitive
reflection into three components, we find that crystallized intelligence is significantly associated
with SCE-8, just as our behavioral measure is. These findings and consistencies lead us to
conclude that the SCE-8 scale is an appropriate substitute for a behavioral measure.
Table 5: Determinants of the SCE-8
Average marginal effects Dependent variable: SCE-8
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Cognitive reflection
-0.421∗∗∗
(0.055)
-0.417∗∗∗
(0.058)
Fluid intelligence
-0.121
(0.068)
-0.125
(0.068)
Crystallized intelligence
-0.339∗∗∗
(0.081)
-0.330∗∗∗
(0.082)
Openness
-0.152∗
(0.066)
-0.116
(0.070)
Demographics X X
Observations 265 265 265 265
∗∗∗p < 0.001; ∗∗p < 0.01; ∗p < 0.05. OLS regressions. All variables are standardized. Robust standard errors
are in parentheses. Specification testing prompted the inclusion of squared and interaction terms of the three
trait measures in (3)-(4), and so average marginal effects are reported. Demographics include sex, age, race,
household income, education, and conservatism. Of the 268 subjects in the sunk cost treatment group, 3 chose
not to specify their sex, leaving 265 for analysis.
12
5 Conclusion
The sunk cost effect is one of the most well-known biases in decision making. Our work ad-
vances the identification, understanding, and measurement of the effect.
We are the first to provide significant evidence of behavior consistent with the effect through
an incentivized experiment with human subjects. In addition, and to aid our design, we offer a
formal choice-based definition. In our sample, we also showed that the endowment effect, far
from accounting for all of it, is approximately only a third as strong as the sunk cost effect.
Second, we find strong evidence that capacity for cognitive reflection is negatively related to
sunk cost behavior: the ability to override ones instinctive response is what matters for over-
coming the effect. Moreover, our results support the intuitive hypothesis that one’s stock of
knowledge and experience is predictive of susceptibility, rather than computational ability.
Third, we offer a scale – the SCE-8 – for researchers to measure susceptibility to the sunk cost
effect, without needing to conduct an experimental exercise. The SCE-8 covers a range of costs,
capturing the generality of the effect, and appears a good substitute for a behavioral measure.
The SCE-8 can be incorporated easily into applied work and can either serve as a measure of
interest per se, or as a control just as other measures have been for decades.
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SCE-8: A scale to measure susceptibility to the sunk cost effect
You will be presented with 8 hypothetical scenarios, each of which lead to a choice. For each one, tell
us what you would do. [For each item subjects have a 6-point scale for which the two alternatives are
written over the left-most and right-most points. The alternatives are provided after each scenario below.]
A. You have been looking forward to this year’s Halloween party. You have the right cape, the right wig,
and the right hat. All week, you have been trying to perfect the outfit by cutting out a large number of
tiny stars to glue to the cape and the hat, and you still need to glue them on. On the day of Halloween,
you decide that the outfit looks better without all these stars you have worked so hard on.
[Wear stars; Go without.]
B. You have been asked to give a toast at your friend’s wedding. You have worked for hours on this one
story about you and your friend taking drivers’ education, but you still have some work to do on it. Then
you realize that you could finish writing the speech faster if you start over and tell the funnier story about
the dance lessons you took together. [Finish the toast about driving; Rewrite the toast about dancing.]
C. You are painting your bedroom with a sponge pattern in your favorite color. It takes a long time to do.
After you finish two of the four walls, you realize you would have preferred the solid color instead of the
sponge pattern. You have enough paint left over to redo the entire room in the solid color. It would take
you the same amount of time as finishing the sponge pattern on the two walls you have left.
[Finish the sponge pattern; redo the room in a solid color.]
D. You have invested a good deal of your time into a project and it is failing. You have the option to start
on something different that you now know is more likely to be successful but you know you cannot get
the time back that you spent on the project. [Keep going with the project; Start something different.]
E. You have an investment strategy that you have developed over several months. It is not working
and you are losing money, but there is no way for you to recover the lost effort put into developing the
strategy. [Start afresh; Keep going.]
F. Your relationship with your partner is not going well. You have reasoned it out and you have realized
that if you knew how it would go when you started the relationship you would not have gone through
with it. You now have the opportunity to break up, but you have been together for many months.
[Keep going; Break up.]
G. You have been thinking about how to vote in an election and have invested a good deal of your time to
try and make the right decisions including reading newspapers and comment pieces online and thinking
hard about the issues. You discover that much of the information you were using is false and a more
trustworthy source suggests your initial view was wrong. [Keep beliefs; change beliefs.]
H. You have been thinking hard about the best route to get to somewhere you haven’t been to before.
Unfortunately, your internet connection isn’t working so you have to base your decision on your beliefs
about the town’s layout. You come to a conclusion on the best possible route but then suddenly the
internet is back online. [Look up route online; Stick to planned route.]
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Table A1: Subject Demographics
Characteristic
Gender
Male 315 (60)
Female 209 (40)
Other / Prefer not to say 4 (0)
Age, mean years [sd] 34.8 [10.3]
18-25 75 (14)
26-30 151 (29)
31-40 176 (33)
41-50 76 (14)
51+ 50 (9)
Race
White 359 (68)
Black or African American 70 (13)
Hispanic or Latino 40 (8)
American Indian or Alaska Native 4 (1)
Asian American 41 (8)
Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander 0 (0)
Other 14 (3)
Incomea
0 − 9.999 16 (3)
10 − 19.999 48 (9)
20 − 29.999 79 (15)
30 − 39.999 79 (15)
40 − 49.999 71 (13)
50 − 59.999 63 (12)
60 − 69.999 38 (7)
70 − 79.999 32 (6)
80 − 89.999 19 (4)
90 − 99.999 30 (6)
100 − 124.999 24 (5)
125 − 149.999 14 (3)
150+ 15 (3)
Education
High school (grades 9-12, no degree) 5 (1)
High school graduate (or equivalent) 66 (13)
Some college (1-4 years, no degree) 175 (33)
Bachelor’s degree (BA, BS, AB, etc) 228 (43)
Master’s degree (MA, MS, MENG, MSW, etc) 47 (9)
Professional school degree (MD, DDC, JD, etc) 5 (1)
Doctorate degree (PhD, EdD, etc) 2 (0)
Political Affiliationb [sd] 36.6 [31.0]
N 528
Frequencies; (% within characteristic); [standard deviation]
a Household annual pre-tax income in ’000 USD
b 0 = “Entirely Liberal”; 100 = “Entirely Conservative”
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Figure A1: SCE-8
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Subjects’ scores (n = 528) on the SCE-8 scale. Each scenario is responded to on a 6-point Likert scale and is
coded 0-5 such that the higher the score, the higher the susceptibility, hence the range is 0-40. Summary statistics
for our sample: min 0, max 40, average 9.5, median 8, inter-quartile range [4,15], and standard deviation 7.5.
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Table A2: Probit coefficients underlying the average marginal effects of Table 3
Dependent variable: Behavior
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Cognitive reflection
-0.399∗∗∗
(0.091)
-0.430∗∗∗
(0.093)
Fluid intelligence
-0.052
(0.120)
-0.038
(0.117)
Crystallized intelligence
-0.696∗∗∗
(0.131)
-0.728∗∗∗
(0.141)
Openness
-0.002
(0.088)
0.002
(0.092)
Female
-0.288
(0.190)
-0.210
(0.200)
White
-0.317
(0.199)
-0.139
(0.220)
Age
0.035
(0.055)
0.051
(0.057)
Age2
-0.000
(0.001)
-0.001
(0.001)
College
0.278
(0.198)
0.289
(0.201)
Income
-0.007
(0.024)
-0.000
(0.028)
Conservatism
-0.000
(0.003)
-0.002
(0.003)
Constant
-1.283
(1.047)
-1.818
(1.084)
Observations 265 265 265 265
∗∗∗p < 0.001; ∗∗p < 0.01; ∗p < 0.05. Probit regressions. Regressors are standardized. Behavior is a binary
variable = 1 if the subject displayed behavior consistent with the sunk cost effect. Estimated coefficients shown
with robust standard errors in parentheses. Of the 268 subjects in the sunk cost treatment group, 3 chose not to
specify their sex, leaving 265 for analysis.
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Table A3: Inputs of the reflective mind
Average marginal effects Dependent variable: Cognitive reflection
Fluid intelligence
0.196∗∗∗
(0.044)
0.193∗∗∗
(0.045)
Crystallized intelligence
0.539∗∗∗
(0.036)
0.527∗∗∗
(0.037)
Openness
-0.020
(0.029)
-0.006
(0.030)
Demographics X
Observations 524 524
∗∗∗p < 0.001; ∗∗p < 0.01; ∗p < 0.05. OLS regressions. Robust standard errors in
parentheses. Regressors are standardized. Specification testing prompted the inclusion
of squared, cubed, and interaction terms of the three trait measures, and so average
marginal effects are reported. Demographics include sex, age, race, household income,
education, and conservatism. Of the total 528 subjects, 4 chose not to specify their sex,
leaving 524 for analysis.
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Table A4: Auxiliary results to Table 3
AMEs Dependent variable: Behavior
Fluid int.
-0.112∗∗∗
(0.025)
-0.107∗∗∗
(0.025)
-0.013
(0.030)
-0.009
(0.028)
Cryst. int.
-0.181∗∗∗
(0.023)
-0.181∗∗∗
(0.026)
-0.173∗∗∗
(0.028)
-0.175∗∗∗
(0.030)
Openness
-0.033
(0.026)
-0.024
(0.026)
Demos. X X X X
Obs. 265 265 265 265 265 265 265 265
∗∗∗p < 0.001; ∗∗p < 0.01; ∗p < 0.05. Probit regressions. Average marginal effects with robust standard errors
in parentheses. Regressors are standardized. Behavior is a binary variable = 1 if behavior was consistent with
the sunk cost effect. Demographics include sex, age, race, household income, education, and conservatism. Of
the 268 subjects in the sunk cost treatment group, 3 chose not to specify their sex, leaving 265 for analysis.
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Redacted transcript: online only. [Bold text in square brackets was not seen by subjects.] 
 
 
Participation Agreement   
 
You have been invited to take part in a research study run by researchers at the University of 
Warwick. Please read the following statements carefully and answer the question below. 
 
Our commitments and privacy policy 
We never deceive participants. For example, if we inform you that another participant is making 
a choice on which you can then react, this is indeed the case. We keep our promises made to 
participants. For example, if we promise a certain payment, participants will indeed receive it. In 
the event that we are responsible for a mistake that is to the disadvantage of participants, we 
will inform and compensate the respective participants. We design, conduct and report our 
research in accordance with recognized scientific standards and ethical principles.      
 
We adhere to the terms of our privacy policy as stated below:   
The data in the participants' database will only be used for the purpose of the study. There is no 
link between the personal data in the participants' database and the data collected during a 
study. The generated anonymous data will be used for analysis. The end product will be publicly 
available. Your participation in this study is purely voluntary, and you may withdraw your 
participation or your data at any time without any penalty to you. Please note that the software 
(Qualtrics) automatically notes the time you spent on each question and this data will be made 
available to researchers for analysis. 
 
If you would like to make a complaint about the way you have been dealt with during the study 
or any possible harm you might have suffered please address your complaint to the person 
below, who is a senior University of Warwick official entirely independent of this study:    
 
Head of Research Governance 
Research & Impact Services 
University House 
University of Warwick 
Coventry 
United Kingdom CV4 8UW 
 
Tel: +44 24 76 522746 
Email: researchgovernance@warwick.ac.uk      
 
If you are happy to proceed, please press the "I agree" button below to continue to the task.  
o I agree 
 
  
  
[EITHER Treatment Group I: Sunk Cost] 
 
Letter-counting task 
 
Your task is to count the number of times specific letters appear in blocks of text (composed of 
Latin words). 
  
You will be shown five blocks of text, one at a time, and for each you will have to count the 
number of occurrences of two different letters. The letters to be counted will appear below the 
block, and next to them will be boxes to input your count for that letter. The blocks will vary in 
size but the time limit to count both letters in each block is always the same (1 minute). The 
blocks will appear in no particular order, i.e. they may start difficult and get easy, vice versa, or 
be in a random order. 
  
For each letter you count correctly you will receive one point. You will be allowed a margin of 
error of one, so your letter count will be considered correct if it corresponds to the true value 
plus or minus one. If you are happy with your counts and wish to move on to the next block 
before the minute is up, simply press the ">>" button at the bottom of the screen. If the time runs 
out, the letter counts you have entered will be submitted and you will move on automatically to 
the next block. Once you have moved on from a block, you cannot go back to it. 
    
If you score at least 6 points out of 10 we will reward your effort by giving you an asset which 
pays $10 with a 10% chance. We will tell you at the end of the blocks whether you scored 
enough points to earn the asset. 
   
Before the task begins, you first have a practice block. This will allow you to get a feel for the 
format and time limit. It does not count for your score out of 10. The practice block will begin 
immediately on the next page. 
o I understand these instructions 
 
 
 [IF the subject scores less than 6/10:] 
 
You scored X/10 points. Unfortunately, you needed 6/10 to acquire the asset. 
 
 
  
  
[IF the subject scores at least 6/10:] 
 
You scored at least 6/10, so you earned the asset.   
    
The asset you now own pays $10 with a 10% chance.   
 
 
Your asset pays $10 with a 10% chance. 
 
Before we cash your asset, you can switch to a new asset that pays $10 with a 20% chance. 
 
What would you like to do? 
o Keep the asset I earned 
o Switch to the new asset 
 
  
  
[OR Treatment Group II: Endowment Group] 
 
You own an asset that pays $10 with a 10% chance. 
 
  
Your asset pays $10 with a 10% chance. 
 
Before we cash your asset, you can switch to a new asset that pays $10 with a 20% chance. 
 
What would you like to do? 
o Keep my asset 
o Switch to the new asset 
 
 
[OR Treatment Group III: Straight Choice Group] 
 
You have a choice between two assets: 
 
Asset A pays $10 with a 10% chance. 
Asset B pays $10 with a 20% chance.   
 
Which do you choose? 
o Asset A  
o Asset B 
 
  
  
[Susceptibility to the Sunk Cost Effect] 
 
Task 1: Choices in hypothetical scenarios 
  
You will be presented with 18 hypothetical scenarios, each of which lead to a choice. For each 
one, tell us what you would do.  
 
[Scenario IDs are shown in braces below. Items were presented in a random order. 
 
Responses were recorded via a 6-point Likert scale with the two alternative actions 
written above the left-most and right-most radio buttons. For each scenario below, those 
words are provided. In each case, one alternative corresponds to behavior consistent 
with the sunk cost effect.] 
 
[1.] You are buying a gold ring on layaway for someone special. It costs $200 and you have 
already put down $100 for it, so you owe another $100. One day, you see in the paper that a 
new jewelry store is selling the same ring for only $90 as a special sale, and you can pay for it 
using layaway. The new store is across the street from the old one. If you decide to get the ring 
from the new store, you will not be able to get your money back from the old store, but you 
would save $10 overall.  
[Continue paying at the old store; Buy from the new store.] 
 
[2.] You enjoy playing tennis, but you really love bowling. You just became a member of a 
tennis club and a bowling club at the same time. The membership to your tennis club costs 
$200 per year and the membership to your bowling club $50 per year. During the first week of 
both memberships, you develop an elbow injury.  It is painful to either play tennis or bowl. Your 
doctor tells you that the pain will continue for about a year.  
[Play tennis; Bowl.] 
 
[3.] You have been looking forward to this year's Halloween party. You have the right cape, the 
right wig, and the right hat. All week, you have been trying to perfect the outfit by cutting out a 
large number of tiny stars to glue to the cape and the hat, and you still need to glue them on. On 
the day of Halloween, you decide that the outfit looks better without all these stars you have 
worked so hard on.  
[Wear stars; Go without.] 
 
[4.] After a large meal at a restaurant, you order a big dessert with chocolate and ice cream. 
After a few bites you find you are full and you would rather not eat any more of it.  
[Eat more; stop eating.] 
 
  
  
[5.] You are staying in a hotel room, and you have just paid $6.95 to watch a non-refundable 
movie on pay TV. You then discover that there is a movie you would much rather see on one of 
the free cable TV channels. You only have time to watch one of the two movies.  
[Watch free cable; Watch paid-for movie.] 
 
[6.] You have been asked to give a toast at your friend's wedding. You have worked for hours 
on this one story about you and your friend taking drivers' education, but you still have some 
work to do on it. Then you realize that you could finish writing the speech faster if you start over 
and tell the funnier story about the dance lessons you took together.  
[Finish the toast about driving; Rewrite the toast about dancing.] 
 
[7.] You decide to learn to play a musical instrument. After you buy an expensive cello, you find 
you are no longer interested. Your neighbor is moving and you are excited that she is leaving 
you her old guitar, for free. You'd like to learn how to play it.  
[Practice the cello; Practice the guitar.] 
 
[8.] You and your friend are at a movie theater together. Both of you are getting bored with the 
storyline. You'd hate to waste the money spent on the ticket, but you both feel that you would 
have a better time at the coffee shop next door. You could sneak out without other people 
noticing.  
[Finish the movie; Leave for the coffee shop.] 
 
[9.] You and your friend have driven halfway to a resort. You both feel sick and think that you 
would have a much better weekend at home. Your friend says it is “too bad” you already drove 
halfway, because you both would much rather spend the time at home. You agree.  
[Turn back; Drive on.] 
 
[10.] You are painting your bedroom with a sponge pattern in your favorite color. It takes a long 
time to do. After you finish two of the four walls, you realize you would have preferred the solid 
color instead of the sponge pattern. You have enough paint left over to redo the entire room in 
the solid color. It would take you the same amount of time as finishing the sponge pattern on the 
two walls you have left.  
[Finish the sponge pattern; redo the room in a solid color.] 
 
[11.] You have invested a good deal of your time into a project and it is failing. You have the 
option to start on something different that you now know is more likely to be successful but you 
know you cannot get the time back that you spent on the project.  
[Keep going with the project; Start something different.] 
 
[12.] You have an investment strategy that you have developed over several months. It is not 
working and you are losing money, but there is no way for you to recover the lost effort put into 
developing the strategy.  
[Start afresh; Keep going.]   
  
[13.] Imagine that you have spent $20 on a ticket to a concert. The day of the concert comes 
but unfortunately it is snowing heavily and you feel tired after a tough day. You know you would 
not have decided to go to the concert if you hadn't already bought the ticket, but you also know 
that you cannot get a refund.  
[Go to the concert; Stay at home.] 
 
[14.] Your relationship with your partner is not going well. You have reasoned it out and you 
have realized that if you knew how it would go when you started the relationship you would not 
have gone through with it. You now have the opportunity to break up, but you have been 
together for many months.  
[Keep going; Break up.] 
 
[15.] You have been thinking about how to vote in an election and have invested a good deal of 
your time to try and make the right decisions including reading newspapers and comment 
pieces online and thinking hard about the issues. You discover that much of the information you 
were using is false and a more trustworthy source suggests your initial view was wrong.  
[Keep beliefs; change beliefs.] 
 
[16.] You have been thinking hard about the best route to get to somewhere you haven't been 
to before. Unfortunately, your internet connection isn't working so you have to base your 
decision on your beliefs about the town's layout. You come to a conclusion on the best possible 
route but then suddenly the internet is back online.  
[Look up route online; Stick to planned route.] 
 
[17.] You are working on a difficult logic problem. Below the problem is a list of possible 
answers labelled a to e. Although you are not very confident about your answer you decide to 
go for option a. A friend you know is usually better at this sort of problem suggests that you 
should change your answer to option b.  
[Answer a; Answer b] 
 
[18.] You have been living in a town where it rains a lot and decide to go and buy a high-quality 
umbrella that you can carry with you every time you go out. Soon after buying a very expensive 
umbrella you move to a town where it rains much less often.  
[Take umbrella with me; Leave umbrella at home.] 
 
  
  
[Fluid Intelligence] 
 
Task 2: Logic puzzles 
  
You will face ten timed multiple choice questions about logic. Each question shows a sequence 
of nine patterns with one missing. Your task is to select the missing pattern from the drop-down 
list. There is only one correct answer for each question.  
 
You will have 30 seconds to answer each question. If you are happy with your answer and wish 
to move on to the next question before the 30 seconds are up, simply press the ">>" button at 
the bottom of the screen. If the time runs out and you have selected an answer, that answer will 
be submitted and you will move on automatically to the next question. If the time runs out and 
you have not selected any answer, that question will be marked as incorrect and you will move 
on automatically to the next question. Once you have moved on from a question, you cannot go 
back to it.   
  
 Before the task begins, you first have a practice question. This will allow you to get a feel for 
the format and time limit. It will not count for the bonus payment. The practice question 
will begin immediately on the next page. 
o I understand these instructions 
 
 
[Crystallized Intelligence and the Cognitive Reflection Test] 
 
Task 3: Knowledge questions 
 
You will now face 23 timed questions testing various aspects of knowledge, with a page after 
question 12 where you can take a break of up to 1 minute.  
 
You have 30 seconds to answer each question. If you are happy with your answer and wish to 
move on to the next question before the 30 seconds are up, simply press the ">>" button at the 
bottom of the screen. If the time runs out and you have selected an answer, that answer will be 
submitted and you will move on automatically to the next question. If the time runs out and you 
have not selected any answer, that question will be marked as incorrect and you will move on 
automatically to the next question. Once you have moved on from a question, you cannot go 
back to it.  
 
The first question will begin immediately on the next page. 
o I understand these instructions 
 
  
  
[Openness] 
 
Task 4: Personality questions 
 
For each statement below, please indicate how accurately it describes you. [Each scale was a  
5-point Likert scale with “Strongly disagree”, “Moderately disagree”, “Neither agree nor 
disagree”, “Moderately agree” and “Strongly agree”.] 
 
[12 questions from the NEO Five Factor Inventory (Costa & McCrae; 1989) followed.] 
 
 
Final Questions: Demography 
 
What is your sex? 
o Male 
o Female 
o Other 
o Prefer not to say 
 
What is your age? 
 
What is your race? 
o White 
o Black or African American 
o Hispanic or Latino 
o American Indian or Alaska Native 
o Asian American 
o Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander 
o Other 
 
What is your household's annual income? (US dollars, before tax) 
o 0-9,999 
o 10,000 - 19,999 
  
o 20,000 - 29,999 
o 30,000 - 39,999 
o 40,000 - 49,999 
o 50,000 - 59,999 
o 60,000 - 69,999 
o 70,000 - 79,999 
o 80,000 - 89,999 
o 90,000 - 99,999 
o 100,000 - 124,999 
o 125,000 - 149,999 
o 150,000 + 
 
What is the highest grade of school you have completed, or the highest degree you have 
received? 
o No schooling (or less than 1 year) 
o Nursery, kindergarten, and elementary (grades 1-8) 
o High school (grades 9-12, no degree) 
o High school graduate (or equivalent) 
o Some college (1-4 years, no degree) 
o Bachelor’s degree (BA, BS, AB, etc) 
o Master’s degree (MA, MS, MENG, MSW, etc) 
o Professional school degree (MD, DDC, JD, etc) 
o Doctorate degree (PhD, EdD, etc) 
 
Generally speaking, which point on this scale best describes your political affiliation?  
[A slider was presented with range [0,100] with “Entirely Liberal” over 0 and “Entirely 
Conservative” over 100.] 
